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When powerful liberal democratic states are found to be complicit in extreme 
violations of human rights, how do they respond, and why do they respond as 
they do? This article explores the various responses of the British state to revela-
tions that UK intelligence and security services colluded in the secret detention, 
rendition and torture of terror suspects during the irst years of the ‘war on 
terror’. These responses, by successive governments, have been characterized by 
denial, obfuscation and systematic attempts to obstruct appropriate investigation 
and avoid accountability. Initially, they latly denied torture ever took place. As 
evidence mounted, they prevaricated and downplayed the severity of the extent 
of the torture, or rationalized and justiied its use in relation to what they argued 
was an existential threat posed by terrorism. Sometimes, they partially admitted 
the facts; but for the most part, their response was to obstruct investigation and 
limit accountability. Here, we examine these responses and attempt to account 
for them within the broader context of British security practices, both histori-
cally and today.
A number of scholars have addressed broader questions of human rights abuses 
by states and the scope for accountability.1 As Neil J. Mitchell has argued, the 
literature on norm compliance has tended to focus on the presence of mechanisms 
for accountability as a predictor for the reduced likelihood of states committing 
human rights violations in the irst place.2 However, little attention has been paid 
to the efectiveness of those mechanisms after violations occur. Accountability 
depends on both ‘a timely and accurate account of actions and policies and how 
they met or fell short of relevant standards of assessment’, and also ‘a requirement 
that consequences follow for those responsible for wrongful actions or policies’.3 
With reference to case-studies from historical and more recent contexts, Mitchell 
argues that when democratic leaders are faced with allegations of involvement in 
human rights abuses, they tend to react in self-interested and opportunistic ways, 
1 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1998); Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink, eds, The power of human 
rights: international norms and domestic change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Todd Landman, 
Protecting human rights: a comparative study (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005).
2 Neil J. Mitchell, Democracy’s blameless leaders. From Dresden to Abu Ghraib: how leaders evade accountability for abuse, 
atrocity, and killing (New York: New York University Press, 2012), pp. 3–4.
3 Mitchell, Democracy’s blameless leaders, p. 27. 
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taking all measures to evade accountability. Democratic leaders are motivated both 
by self-preservation—saving face, retaining their positions—and by their desire to 
continue to govern, which in turn depends on maintaining the loyalty of oicials, 
especially security oicials. This is achieved through avoiding punishment of those 
responsible, or, when necessary, enacting it at the lowest plausible level of the 
command chain.4 Mitchell points to four techniques for evading accountability: 
denial—of what happened or of responsibility for it; delay—of accountability, for 
example through instigating multiple inquiries, which tends to generate confu-
sion over the details; delegation—of responsibility down the chain of command 
to those at the lowest plausible level; and diversion—admitting responsibility, but 
questioning the standards applied to evaluate the action.5 
Our own research on British collusion in torture in the ‘war on terror’ reinforces 
Mitchell’s indings. Indeed, it reveals evidence of all the techniques for evasion of 
accountability set out above. But this work goes further, to argue that the responses 
of successive UK leaders were not aimed simply at saving face and preserving the 
capacity of leaders to govern. The various forms of denial and obstruction in this 
case are also designed to ensure that collusion can continue uninterrupted. A core 
concern of intelligence oicials and ministers has been to prevent any process that 
would lead to a comprehensive prohibition on involvement in operations where 
torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (CIDT) are a real possibility. 
Moreover, as we have argued elsewhere, contemporary forms of British involve-
ment in torture emerge from, and are deeply shaped by, a long history of colonial 
and post-colonial use of torture by the British state.6 
Our focus here is primarily on collusion in torture by the UK’s intelligence 
agencies, given that past scholarly work has tended to focus on the role of mili-
tary personnel in the abuse of prisoners, especially in Iraq,7 or on the relationship 
between interrogation and torture, historically and in the ‘war on terror’.8 Far less 
attention has been paid to the role of British intelligence services in torture, not least 
because of the high levels of secrecy surrounding it, which makes research di cult.9 
The work presented here, based on ten years of researching the CIA’s Rendition, 
Detention and Interrogation programme, including UK involvement, ills this gap. 
We begin with a brief overview of British torture in the ‘war on terror’, and 
situate this in the historical context of previous collusion in torture by British 
4 Mitchell, Democracy’s blameless leaders, pp. 23–4, 188–9.
5 Mitchell, Democracy’s blameless leaders, pp. 27–30.
6 Ruth Blakeley and Sam Raphael, ‘British torture in the war on terror’, European Journal of International Relations 
23: 2, 2016, pp. 243–66. 
7 Huw Bennett, ‘The Baha Mousa tragedy: British Army detention and interrogation from Iraq to Afghani-
stan’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 16: 2, 2014, pp. 211–29; Andrew Williams, A very Brit-
ish killing: the death of Baha Mousa (London: Vintage, 2013); Owen David Thomas, ‘Security in the balance: 
how Britain tried to keep its Iraq War secrets’, Security Dialogue, publ. online May 2019, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0967010619839544. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article 
were accessible on 31 Jan. 2020.)
8 Samantha Newbery, Interrogation, intelligence and security: controversial British techniques (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press 2015), and ‘The UK, interrogation and Iraq, 2003–8’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 27: 4, Aug. 
2016, pp. 659–80.
9 Although see the earlier work of Alex Danchev, ‘Accomplicity: Britain, torture and terror’, British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations 8: 4, 2006, pp. 587–601.
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security services. It is now clear that British intelligence was implicated in 
widespread, systematic abuses after 9/11, and that these practices were known 
about at the highest levels. As we have argued previously, the involvement of 
UK oicials in such practices took a particular form, shaped by the desire to 
maintain clean hands and thereby plausibly sustain a ‘narrative of denial’.10 The 
recent indings of parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), which 
provide the most detailed account to date of the extent of British involvement, 
support our argument in this regard. We then explore the various steps the United 
Kingdom has taken to deny its involvement and to constrain investigation and 
limit accountability. We demonstrate that even where the UK government has 
permitted investigations, none of these has delivered an adequate reckoning. 
Instead, they have become implicated in what we term the machinery of denial, 
and are instrumental in carving out spaces in which certain actors, including 
government ministers, can be exempted from the anti-torture norm in future. 
Finally, we explore the contours of contemporary practice by the British state. 
We argue that, while ministers claim that the oversight regime ensures compliance 
with strict legal and ethical rules, in reality the door remains—deliberately—wide 
open for continued British collusion in torture. Worryingly, available evidence 
suggests that such collusion is not merely hypothetical. The past and the present 
are entwined: it is only because of the refusal to acknowledge the full extent of 
‘war on terror’ collusion—and the simultaneous prevention of a comprehensive 
account of this being published—that current forms of complicity can continue 
to sit at the heart of British intelligence and security practices.
British torture in the ‘war on terror’
The use of torture by British security services is not new.11 Indeed, the United 
States and United Kingdom have a long history of collusion in torture, within 
the contexts of both imperial expansion and resistance to anti-imperialist strug-
gles.12 Elkins, for example, illustrates how both British oicials and colonial agents 
acting for the British state used torture widely in eforts to crush the Mau Mau 
insurgency in Kenya in the 1950s.13 Likewise, torture was used directly by British 
oicials in attempts to forestall independence in Malaya (1948–60), in Cyprus 
10 Blakeley and Raphael, ‘British torture in the war on terror’. 
11 Ruth Blakeley, ‘Why torture?’, Review of International Studies 33: 3, 2007, pp. 373–94; Blakeley and Raphael, 
‘British torture in the war on terror’.
12 Leslie Bethell, The Cambridge history of Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 8–43; 
Caroline Elkins, Britain’s gulag: the brutal end of empire in Kenya (London: Cape, 2005); David Killingray, A plague 
of Europeans: westerners in Africa since the ifteenth century (London: Penguin, 1973), and ‘The maintenance of law 
and order in British colonial Africa’, African Afairs 85: 340, 1986, pp. 411–27; Elisabeth Wood, Insurgent collective 
action and civil war in El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Torture: 
cancer of democracy (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963); Ruth Blakeley, State terrorism and neoliberalism: the North 
in the South (London: Routledge, 2009); Martha Huggins, Political policing: the United States and Latin America 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Darius Rejali, Torture and democracy (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2007); Douglas Valentine, The Phoenix Program (New York: Authors Guild Back-
inPrint.com, 2000). 
13 Elkins, Britain’s gulag.
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(1955–9) and in Aden (1963–7).14 Moreover, within just a few years, similar practices 
were deployed much closer to home: in early 1971, the British government insti-
gated the use of internment without trial in Northern Ireland to contain spiral-
ling sectarian violence. This was accompanied by the development and routine 
use of the so-called ‘Five Techniques’: sleep deprivation; hooding; subjecting to 
noise; food and drink deprivation; and stress positions.15 The controversy around 
these methods fed into the development of a network of contemporary policy and 
legal constraints on the use of violence by UK oicials outside military theatres 
of war. New guidelines were issued by the Joint Intelligence Committee in June 
1972. Authorized directly by Prime Minister Edward Heath, the guidelines made 
clear that the use of coercive interrogations by UK personnel would henceforth 
be banned. This commitment remains a foundation stone in declaratory policy 
regarding the treatment of prisoners, and provides a clear backdrop against which 
UK agencies have had to operate in the post-9/11 era.
Yet it has now been deinitively established that British intelligence agencies 
were deeply and directly involved in the abuse of prisoners throughout the irst 
years of the ‘war on terror’. The evidential record of UK complicity in torture in 
the ‘war on terror’ has been compiled over a number of years through the pains-
taking work of journalists, NGOs and parliamentarians. Our previous work on 
the subject put the matter beyond any reasonable doubt,16 and was used by the 
ISC during its four-year inquiry into the mistreatment and rendition of detainees. 
Taking evidence from us in January 2017,17 and reviewing over 40,000 documents 
(many of which remain classiied and unseen by us), the ISC published two reports 
into detainee mistreatment and rendition in June 2018. The irst set out the involve-
ment of British intelligence in prisoner mistreatment between 2001 and 2010, and 
presented devastating indings, concluding that the agencies ‘tolerated actions, and 
took others, that we regard as inexcusable’.18 Importantly, involvement was not 
limited to a small number of isolated infractions, but was widespread and carried 
out with what seems to have been at least some knowledge on the part of senior 
oicials. Indeed, while the intelligence agencies maintained that they were not 
aware of the systematic mistreatment of prisoners by foreign partners, the ISC 
was clear that the multiple reports from personnel on the ground, combined with 
media and other reporting, make it ‘di cult to comprehend how those at the top 
of the oice did not’ have knowledge of the situation.19
14 Mark Curtis, Web of deceit: Britain’s real role in the world (London: Vintage, 2003), pp. 334–9.
15 Ian Cobain, Cruel Britannia: a secret history of torture (London: Portobello, 2012).
16 Blakeley and Raphael, ‘British torture in the war on terror’; Sam Raphael, Crofton Black, Ruth Blakeley and 
Steve Kostas, ‘Tracking rendition aircraft as a way to understand CIA secret detention and torture in Europe’, 
International Journal of Human Rights 20: 1, 2015, pp. 78–103; Sam Raphael, Crofton Black and Ruth Blakeley, 
CIA torture unredacted (London: Rendition Project and Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2019), https://
www.therenditionproject.org.uk/unredacted/the-report.html. 
17 We were the only witnesses to the inquiry who neither were, nor had been, either ministers or intelligence 
oicials. Several former prisoners and their lawyers met with the committee, which was directed to their 
existing public statements.
18 Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, HC1113 (London: 
ISC, 2018), p. 5. 
19 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 4. Indeed, the extent to which the UK intelligence 
community even acts autonomously from its US partners has been increasingly brought into question, espe-
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Much of this involvement took place within the context of a systematic 
programme of secret detention, rendition and torture undertaken by the CIA, in 
conjunction with allies from around the world. Our broader work has mapped the 
evolution and operational architecture of CIA torture, as well as the sheer brutality 
of the abuses which took place, and stands as the deinitive public account of the 
programme.20
Britain was clearly implicated in these abuses. The agencies knew of the 
existence of CIA ‘black’ sites, with internal memos referencing ‘“black” facilities’ 
and ‘other centres where the chances of complaint from allied representatives are 
slight’.21 Nevertheless, intelligence and questions continued to be passed to the CIA 
for use in interrogations, despite knowledge of the secret detention and torture 
to which prisoners were being subjected. For example, both the Security Service 
(MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, also MI6) supplied questions for 
the interrogation of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed while he was held and tortured 
in a Polish black site in 2003, and the Government Communications Headquarters 
approved the use of its intelligence for his questioning, all despite knowledge that 
he was being mistreated while held in a secret location.22 Likewise, although by 
May 2002 SIS was aware that Abu Zubaydah was held in a black site in Thailand, 
and was being tortured, British intelligence continued to send the CIA questions 
to be used in his interrogation.23
These two cases were not anomalous. The ISC found at least 232 cases in 
which UK oicials supplied questions or intelligence to partners after they 
became aware, or suspected, that the detainees in question were being mistreated. 
In a further 198 cases, British intelligence received information from partners 
when it was known, or suspected, that such intelligence came from interroga-
tions under torture. Binyam Mohamed, for example, was tortured in Moroccan 
detention as part of the CIA’s programme, in part on the basis of intelligence and 
questions supplied by British agencies.24 Mohamed has given a detailed account 
of his torture in Morocco during the period in which the British were supplying 
questions.25 In another case, the ISC found that an SIS oicer was present while 
a prisoner was transferred from Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan in a coin-sized 
box, which was sealed and then loaded onto a truck to be taken to a waiting US 
aircraft.26 It has since been reported that this prisoner, codenamed CUCKOO in 
the ISC report, was Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi, who was transferred by the CIA from 
cially since the Snowden revelations.
20 Raphael et al., CIA torture unredacted.
21 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, pp. 52–4. 
22 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 54. 
23 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 42. This case is currently under investigation by the Metro-
politan Police for possible criminal conduct on behalf of British intelligence oicials. See Owen Bowcott, 
‘Police investigating role of UK oicers in torture of Al-Qaida suspect’, Guardian, 31 March 2019, https://
www.theguardian.com/law/2019/mar/31/police-investigating-role-of-uk-oicers-in-torture-of-al-qaida-
suspect.
24 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, pp. 40–41.
25 Clive A. Staford Smith, ‘Memo: FBI involvement in abuse of Binyam Mohammed (Al Habashi)’ (Reprieve, 
24 Aug. 2005), https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/RDI/050824-Reprieve-Account-of-
BM-Detention-and-Rendition.pdf, p. 9.
26 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 32. 
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Bagram to Egypt, whereupon he was subjected to severe torture.27 The UK was 
directly implicated in these abuses, with the ISC inding that ‘MI5 continued to 
pass questions for [al-Libi’s] interrogation after his rendition to [Egypt] and both 
SIS and MI5 received reports from subsequent interrogations’.28
Importantly, the hundreds of cases of collaboration identiied by the ISC point 
to a clear set of systematic institutional practices, with British involvement in the 
mistreatment of prisoners known or suspected both by individual personnel and 
by head oice. For example, in one case an SIS oicer reported to head oice in 
September 2004 the conditions of detention at a US facility in Iraq, ALNWICK, 
where prisoners were held in small wooden crates, each ‘slightly less than 200cm 
long, about 180cm high and 120cm wide’.29 When a second SIS oicer arrived at 
the facility in January 2005, he found what he described as a ‘torture centre’. In 
testimony to the ISC, this oicer stated that
ALNWICK itself was a place where the US took detainees and subjected them to various 
things which I regard as torture and I think in most people’s understanding of the term 
is torture. So, most notably, when people were brought there, they were put in wooden 
crates, which were designed so that you could neither lie down nor stand up and they were 
obviously dark.30
This oicer’s assessment was clearly not anomalous, and British intelligence were 
aware at an institutional level of mistreatment at the facility. Moreover, regardless 
of any legal duty upon British personnel to intervene meaningfully with their US 
partners to protest against the practices observed, SIS and Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) lawyers simply formulated a new policy in 2005 forbidding interviews to 
take place at ALNWICK. Furthermore, the ISC found that ‘in practice this meant 
that detainees were transferred to an adjacent Portakabin at ALNWICK where 
conditions were “to UK standards” to be interviewed, but following the interview 
they were simply taken back to ALNWICK’. And, crucially, it was the wording of 
the policy originating from head oice which facilitated such practice:
I think it must, there must have been enough ambiguity in the way the policy was commu-
nicated—I’m not questioning the policy—but there must have been enough ambiguity 
in the communication of it to allow that to happen ...  I’m pretty sure that, even in that 
environment, if you have a written legal advice saying, ‘Do not do this’, we will not just 
go and do it anyway.31
The ISC also found that British intelligence was deeply involved in the 
practice of unlawful prisoner transfers (renditions), even though such opera-
tions often involved the severe mistreatment of the prisoners being transferred,32 
and even where such transfers were to states where the risk of further torture or 
27 Ian Cobain and Clara Usiskin, ‘Exclusive: UK spy agencies knew source of false Iraq War intelligence was 
tortured’, Middle East Eye, 6 Nov. 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uk-rendition-ibn-al-sheikh-
al-libi-iraq-war-806970986. 
28 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 32.
29 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 35.
30 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 36.
31 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, pp. 36–7.
32 Raphael et al., CIA torture unredacted, pp. 18–19.
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other mistreatment was high or near certain.33 British intelligence knew about, 
suggested, planned, agreed to, paid for others to conduct or otherwise enabled 
rendition operations in more than 70 cases.34 
Again, it is clear that British involvement in these operations was understood 
at the highest levels. The then foreign secretary Jack Straw personally authorized 
the rendition of Abdel Hakim Belhadj and Fatima Boudchar to Libya,35 and the 
then director of counterterrorism at SIS, Mark Allen, explicitly congratulated his 
counterpart in Libya on the ‘safe arrival’ of Belhadj and conirmed direct British 
access to the detainee’s interrogations.36 In cases such as these, the operations were 
clearly unlawful and, given institutional knowledge of the human rights records 
of receiving states, the agencies could not have reasonably concluded otherwise. 
Indeed, the documentary record makes clear that senior oicials were well aware 
of the legal problems associated with such operations and the need to conceal 
British involvement. In one case, for example, SIS was asked by a liaison partner 
to make a inancial contribution for a rendition. Subsequent emails between SIS 
and MI5 indicate that MI5 was reluctant to provide funding given the ‘di cult 
legal circumstances’, but inally agreed to assist so long as the payment would ‘be 
made after the event [so that it could be] argued it was not speciically for the 
light’.37 In another case, SIS paid a large share of the costs of rendering two men 
in October 2004, in an operation Straw authorized. Although SIS fed in questions 
to subsequent interrogations of the two men, they ‘chose not to seek direct access, 
due to HMG concerns about publicly exposing British involvement in “forced 
deportations” and detentions’.38
The ISC’s indings, based on a reading of signiicant amounts of classiied 
documentation to which we have not had access, demonstrate as never before the 
sheer extent of British involvement in torture. Nonetheless, they also conirm our 
previous indings concerning both the scope of this involvement and what we have 
called the peculiarly British approach to torture during this period—an approach 
shaped largely by the consequences of, and public reaction to, earlier forms of 
(more direct) British torture. The contemporary approach, we have argued, ‘has 
been characterised by a cautious pantomime of legal and procedural adherence to 
international legal commitments and earlier policy statements’, which has become 
ever more central to the public positioning around liberal norms, security practices 
and the challenges of contemporary security.39 Procedurally, this has played out 
through the development of clear parameters within which intelligence personnel 
33 Sir Peter Gibson, The report of the detainee inquiry (London: The Stationery Oice, 19 Dec. 2013), https://www.
therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/RDI/131219-Detainee-Inquiry-Report.pdf, pp. 34–6.
34 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, pp. 88–90, 99–101.
35 Rajeev Syal and Ian Cobain, ‘Jack Straw faces call to give evidence over role in Libyan rendition’, Guard-
ian, 11 May 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/may/11/jack-straw-give-evidence-role-libyan-
rendition-abdel-hakim-belhaj-fatima-boudchar.
36 Memo from Mark Allen, SIS, to Musa Kusa, Department of International Relations and Collaboration, Libya, 
18 March, 2004, https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/RDI/040318-MI6-Memo-Blair-Trip-
and-Belhadj-Rendition.pdf.
37 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 88.
38 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 89. 
39 Blakeley and Raphael, ‘British torture in the war on terror’, pp. 244–5, 251.
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would need to act. These dictated that oicials should neither have the legal 
responsibility for prisoners (they would rarely, if ever, be the formal detaining 
authority), nor be physically present during periods of mistreatment and torture. 
With these caveats in place, involvement in abusive practices was deemed legiti-
mate, ensuring that the agencies could remain full partners of the United States 
and other allies, including in the use of torture, rendition and illegal detention, 
while at the same time continuing to insist that the UK counterterrorism efort 
was underpinned by a robust commitment to human rights.40
In line with these conclusions, the ISC found that at no point did British intel-
ligence have detaining authority over individuals, that there were no instances of 
direct physical mistreatment by UK intelligence oicials, and that there were only 
two cases where they were involved in the mistreatment perpetrated by others.41 
In all other cases, British personnel were absent while the torture took place. 
Indeed, at times oicials left the room speciically for the period of the torture, 
before returning again to continue their involvement in the interrogation.42 
Similarly, the ISC found no evidence of British intelligence undertaking rendi-
tion operations unilaterally; instead, they supported others in doing so—through 
planning and coordination, including the provision of funding and locational 
intelligence—in ways which ‘amount to simple outsourcing of action which they 
knew they were not allowed to undertake themselves’.43
However, even this is not the full story. Dogged investigation by a number of 
researchers, and the subsequent growth of documentary evidence, have increas-
ingly required the United Kingdom to respond to allegations of complicity in 
torture. As we argue in the next section, the response of the state to the mounting 
evidence of involvement in human rights abuses is itself shaped by a desire to 
sustain both a narrative of denial regarding the past—‘Britain neither tortures, 
nor facilitates torture’—and the freedom to continue colluding in torture where 
deemed necessary. Although there is a range of individual state practices, each of 
which plays out in diferent ways depending on the situational context, overall 
we argue that together they represent more than the sum of their parts. There is 
a systematic dimension which has characterized UK responses to allegations of 
collusion, which—considered as a whole—have clearly designed within them the 
imperative to deny a full reckoning with the torturous past. We identify a broad 
machinery of denial: a set of durable, interconnecting institutional practices enacted 
by the state, across government agencies and departments, across administrations, 
and both contemporaneously and ex post facto. We turn now to trace the architec-
ture of this machinery.
40 Blakeley and Raphael, ‘British torture in the war on terror’, pp. 252–3.
41 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, pp. 21–8.
42 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 34; Gibson, The report of the detainee inquiry, p. 28; Human 
Rights Watch, Cruel Britannia: British complicity in the torture and ill-treatment of terror suspects in Pakistan (New 
York, 24 Nov. 2009), https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/RDI/091124-HRW-Cruel-
Britannia.pdf.
43 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 90.
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The machinery of denial
Suppressing evidence
Senior intelligence oicials and ministers have, for more than 15 years and in the 
face of demonstrable evidence of collusion, outright refused to acknowledge any 
involvement in torture. In some cases, such denials were clearly lies (by omission 
if nothing else). For example, in response to the initial allegations of UK involve-
ment in CIA rendition operations,44 Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was asked by 
the Select Committee on Foreign Afairs in December 2005 to
give a categorical statement to this Committee now that this government is not involved 
in any type of rendition, that we are not assisting, with the Americans, in rendition of 
their suspects or their personnel and that we are deinitely not involved in any rendition 
of anyone for the purposes of being taken to another country to a secret site, or whatever, 
for the purposes of torture?
It is now known that, by this point, Straw had personally authorized involve-
ment by SIS in numerous rendition operations, many of which were to countries 
where the risk of torture or other mistreatment was signiicant.45 Nonetheless, he 
issued a lat denial:
First of all on your last point [involvement in rendition for torture], Eric, yes, I absolutely 
categorically can give you that undertaking ...  Unless we all start to believe in conspiracy 
theories and that the oicials are lying, that I am lying, that behind this there is some kind 
of secret state which is in league with some dark forces in the United States ...  there 
simply is no truth in the claims that the United Kingdom has been involved in rendition 
full stop, because we have not been, and so what on earth a judicial inquiry would start to 
do I have no idea. I do not think it would be justiied.46
Similarly, Prime Minister Tony Blair insisted in 2005 that
the notion that I, or the Americans, or anybody else approve or condone torture, or 
ill-treatment, or degrading treatment, that is completely and totally out of order in any 
set of circumstances ...  I have absolutely no evidence to suggest that anything illegal has 
been happening here at all, and I am not going to start ordering inquiries into this, that 
and the next thing.47
Senior intelligence oicials have also long denied involvement in torture. In oral 
testimony to an earlier coniguration of the ISC in November 2006, the Chief of SIS 
Sir John Scarlett admitted that the agency had directly assisted ‘a very small number 
of renditions where we were certain that there was no risk of torture or CIDT, and 
44 Ian Cobain and Luke Harding, ‘UK “breaking law” over CIA secret lights’, Guardian, 5 Dec. 2005, https://
www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/dec/05/uk.usa.
45 Gibson, The report of the detainee inquiry, pp. 34–6. Although full details of which operations were authorized 
by Straw are still classiied, he has admitted to authorizing involvement in Belhadj’s rendition. See Syal and 
Cobain, ‘Jack Straw faces call to give evidence’.
46 Jack Straw, ‘Examination of witnesses (questions 20–39)’, House of Commons Select Committee on 
Foreign Afairs, Minutes of evidence, 13 Dec. 2005, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/
cmfaf/768/5121304.htm.
47  ‘Rendition: Blair in quotes’, BBC News, 19 Jan. 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4627360.stm. 
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where the circumstances would permit this assistance without the breach of our 
country’s international obligations’. However, Scarlett was adamant that SIS had
never assisted any renditions into so-called ‘black facilities’ ...  [nor] renditions to third 
countries, i.e. renditions to countries other than the USA or the detainee’s country of 
origin ...  [nor] renditions to the detainee’s country of origin where there was a real risk of 
CIDT or torture, or which would breach the UK’s international obligations.48
It was this misleading of the public record by SIS (with or without the connivance 
of the ISC) which enabled the committee to conclude in 2007 that UK intelligence 
agencies had overseen only minor, isolated infractions of UK policy, and overall had 
not acted improperly. There was, it concluded, ‘no evidence that the UK Agencies 
were complicit in any “Extraordinary Rendition” operations’, where these involved 
a ‘real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’.49 Likewise, the ISC 
accepted the agencies’ now demonstrably false claims that, with regard to sharing 
intelligence on speciic suspects with liaison partners, there were robust safeguards 
to ensure that such intelligence was not used in torture or mistreatment:
Where there are concerns, the Agencies seek credible assurances that any action taken 
on the basis of intelligence provided by the UK Agencies would be humane and lawful. 
Where credible assurances cannot be obtained, the Chief of SIS explained ‘ ...  then we 
cannot provide the information.’50
Similar denial characterizes the government’s response to the ISC’s more 
comprehensive indings in 2018. Prime Minister Theresa May’s statement to parlia-
ment in June 2018, released alongside the ISC reports, rearticulated this position: 
‘UK personnel are bound by applicable principles of domestic and international 
law. The government do not participate in, solicit, encourage or condone the use 
of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment for any purpose.’51 In the 
ensuing House of Commons debate, Foreign Oice Minister Sir Alan Duncan MP 
reiterated this claim, asserting that ‘we can and should be proud of the work done 
by our intelligence and service personnel’ and that Britain should feel conident 
in being able to ‘maintain our global reputation as a champion for human rights 
across the world’. Notwithstanding the ISC’s indings, Duncan took ‘issue with 
[the] use of the word “complicity”, which I think was a notch too strong. I think 
it is honest to say that the ISC found no evidence that the agencies had deliberately 
turned a blind eye.’ Likewise, Duncan stated that he would
be grateful if [Shadow Foreign Minister Emily Thornberry MP] thought again about 
the words she used when she accused oicials in our agencies—I think that I quote 
accurately—of being ‘involved in torture’, they were not involved in torture, so I really 
think the right hon. Lady may want to come back to the House and say that, actually, that 
is an inaccurate accusation.52
48 ISC, Rendition (London: Parliament Intelligence and Security Committee, 2007), pp. 51–2. 
49 ISC, Rendition, p. 64.
50 ISC, Rendition, p. 13. 
51 Hansard (Commons), 28 June 2018, col. 41WS.
52 Hansard (Commons), 2 July 2018, col. 28.
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Other ministers followed suit, as did the government’s more detailed, written 
response to the ISC reports.53
Overall, the government’s response has shown a remarkable level of consis-
tency, with ‘top lines’ clearly agreed upon and repeated wherever necessary. Such 
a narrative is only sustainable, however, to the extent that Britain has succeeded 
in denying full exposure of its involvement in torture. In this sense, ministers 
and intelligence oicials have long presided over a culture of secrecy, enacting 
a strategy designed to limit oversight and accountability. This was in play from 
the earliest phase of the ‘war on terror’, with evidence that intelligence oicers 
failed to produce, or altered the production of, documentary records relating to 
involvement in the mistreatment of prisoners. Many of MI5’s ‘prisoner interview 
reports’, introduced in January 2002, appear to have been misplaced, or not to have 
been completed in the irst place. SIS did not maintain formal records until April 
2005, and even after this date there are multiple cases where the ‘detainee contact 
reports’ were completed either partially or not at all.54 This was no mistake: one 
SIS oicer testiied to the ISC that ‘whilst it may be SIS culture to record every-
thing, there were situations [of mistreatment] where people would say something 
was “not for the write-up”’. The oicer testiied that there
was quite an emphasis then on not putting things in writing ...  Because presumably they 
didn’t want the ISC to read the documents later ...  It wasn’t as if the basic attitude to 
record-keeping had been abandoned; it was more that the more complicated stuf that was 
at the fringes of normal was not being recorded.
Often, interrogations were framed as ‘owned’ by a liaison service and ‘we just 
happened to be there’, while reports were routinely and systematically illed in 
with ‘no’ against the list of potential mistreatment concerns in the template.55
Where reports from ield oicers did describe mistreatment at particular facili-
ties, these appear to have been altered before being passed to the ISC. In one case, 
an SIS oicer visiting a US-run site witnessed a number of hooded prisoners, 
with at least one forcibly kept kneeling on his bed in a particular stress position. 
Nonetheless, a Defence Intelligence legal adviser later persuaded SIS to remove 
all mention of this in submissions to the ISC, claiming a ‘misunderstanding’ on 
the part of the SIS oicial who had visited the facility. As one MoD document 
stated:
In light of the apparent misunderstanding it was agreed that reference to the discus-
sion between [the head of the MoD interrogation team] and the SIS operative would be 
removed from the SIS submission [to the ISC]. A letter was subsequently sent to SIS reiter-
ating the position and thanking SIS for the opportunity of resolving this matter before it 
was exposed to the ISC.56
53 Hansard (Commons), 15 July 2019, col. 591; HM Government, Government response to the Intelligence and Security 
Committee of Parliament reports into detainee mistreatment and rendition (London: Cabinet Oice, Nov. 2018), p. 7.
54 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 21.
55 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 34.
56 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, pp. 26–7.
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Flight records of aircraft landing at Diego Garcia also went missing before the 
ISC had an opportunity to review the material, including for crucial periods when 
there is clear evidence that the island was used to facilitate rendition operations. 
The FCO claimed that relevant records were ‘incomplete due to water damage’, 
and when challenged to provide details of such damage, reversed their position 
and claimed they had ‘dried out’.57 Subsequent review of these records by the ISC 
found that the recording policy was ‘woefully inadequate [and] clearly indicates 
that the record review cannot be relied on to provide any assurances’.58 This is not 
just a case of destroying records: ministers have also consistently refused to gather 
evidence of the use of UK territory in rendition operations. As the then foreign 
secretary David Miliband made clear in May 2008, ‘we do not consider that a 
light transiting our territory or airspace on its way to or from a possible rendition 
operation constitutes rendition’. As such, the UK has only sought assurances from 
the US that prisoners are not on board when rendition aircraft land on UK soil, 
and ministers have repeatedly refused to broaden their investigation.59 This is of 
no small consequence, given that we have established that the use of UK territory 
in the rendition programme was much more extensive than previously thought, 
even by the ISC.60 Likewise, the government has persistently refused to investigate 
or block aircraft that have been shown to have rendered prisoners to torture, citing 
the need to avoid undermining ‘key areas of cooperation’.61
Limiting and misleading investigations
Successive UK governments have gone to considerable lengths to prevent existing 
details of collusion in torture from coming to light in the UK courts. Some civil 
actions have been brought against the British government, but it has adopted 
various measures to prevent key aspects of cases from being heard in open court, 
or to have them ruled as non-justiciable in their entirety. 
In speciic cases, the UK government has sought to withhold the publication 
of key documents, including those which show that British intelligence oicers 
knew about the torture of prisoners held by the CIA in advance of participating in 
their interrogation, as was the case with Binyam Mohamed.62 Where the govern-
ment has had to defend itself against allegations of complicity in mistreatment, 
intelligence agencies have been shown to have intercepted—for exploitation—
privileged communication between lawyers and their clients, in what was clearly 
57 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 95.
58 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 98.
59 David Miliband, letter to Andrew Tyrie, chair of all-party parliamentary group on rendition, 5 June 2018, 
https://www.extraordinaryrendition.org/documents/appg-letters/send/23-foreign-oice/260-miliband-
reply-05-06-08.html. 
60 For early reporting of our indings, see Iain Cobain, ‘UK provided more support for CIA rendition lights than 
thought—study’, Guardian, 22 May 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/22/uk-support-
cia-rendition-lights. For full details, see Raphael et al., CIA torture unredacted, pp. 44–5.
61 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: current issues (London, 2018), p. 82.
62 UK Court of Appeal, Binyam Mohamed v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Afairs, approved judg-
ment (case no: T1/2009/2331), 10 Feb. 2010, http://www.refworld.org/pdid/4ba8c30e8.pdf. 
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an institutionally accepted practice.63 Where the UK courts have refused govern-
ment requests to hold hearings in secret, as in the case brought by ive former 
Guantánamo Bay prisoners who alleged that Britain colluded in their detention 
and mistreatment, the government ofered substantial payouts but refused to 
admit any liability on the part of UK authorities.64 Likewise, although the govern-
ment spent over £11 million attempting to keep the Belhadj litigation out of the 
courts,65 arguing that the case was non-justiciable as it turned on the actions of a 
foreign state (the US), the Supreme Court’s judgment in January 2017 found that 
position to be untenable.66 This judgment was followed by a full apology from the 
government to Belhadj and Boudchar, without admission of liability, in an efort 
to minimize public exposure of additional details of UK involvement.67
UK governments have also intervened to ensure that parliamentary and 
congressional inquiries limit exposure of British complicity. It would seem that 
from 2009 onwards, UK government oicials made regular representations to the 
US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to ensure that mentions of the UK 
were redacted from its inal report.68 The ISC investigation itself was signiicantly 
constrained, which meant that it was unable to provide a full account of British 
collusion.69 For example, the government refused to provide access to members of 
the intelligence agencies who had been on the ground at the time, so that the list of 
potential witnesses was reduced to just four individuals. The committee was in no 
doubt that ‘the terms and conditions imposed were such that we would be unable 
to conduct an authoritative inquiry and produce a credible report’, and conse-
quently ‘concluded—reluctantly—that it must draw a line under the Inquiry’. 
Its indings, it made clear, were ‘not, and must not be taken to be, a deinitive 
account’.70 Moreover, many of the committee’s most important indings, such 
as they are, have been redacted from the publicly available version of the report. 
These redactions include names of torture victims, perpetrators of abuses, and 
locations and dates of almost all cases uncovered by the ISC.
63 Tom Warren and Melanie Newman, Intelligence agencies target and exploit legally privileged communications, tribu-
nal hears (London: Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 6 Nov. 2014), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/
stories/2014-11-06/intelligence-agencies-target-and-exploit-legally-privileged-communications-tribunal-hears.
64 Dominic Casciani, ‘UK pays £2.2m to settle Libyan rendition claim’, BBC News, 13 Dec. 2012, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20715507; ‘Government to compensate ex-Guantánamo Bay detainees’, BBC News, 16 
Nov. 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11762636.
65 Owen Bowcott, ‘UK spent £11m of public money ighting Libya rendition case’, Guardian, 24 April 2019, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/apr/24/uk-public-money-ighting-libya-rendition-case-abdel-
hakim-belhaj-fatima-boudchar.
66 UK Supreme Court, Belhaj and another (respondents) v. Straw and others (appellants), Rahmatullah (no. 1) (respond-
ent) v. Ministry of Defence and another (appellants), judgment (UKSC3), 17 Jan. 2017, https://www.supremecourt.
uk/cases/docs/uksc-2014-0264-judgment.pdf.
67 Hansard (Commons), 10 May 2018, col. 926–7. 
68 Rowena Mason, ‘UK ministers met Senate committee during torture inquiry, papers reveal’, Guardian, 12 
Dec. 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/dec/12/uk-ministers-senate-committee-cia-torture-report; 
Foreign and Commonwealth Oice, North America Dept, letter to Reprieve: Freedom of Information Act 2000 
request ref. 0672-14, 1 Aug. 2014, http://www.reprieve.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/2014_08_01_PUB-
FOI-response-UK-SSCI-meetings.pdf.
69 On the continuing weaknesses of parliamentary oversight of the UK intelligence agencies, as embodied by the 
ISC, see Andrew Defty, ‘Coming in from the cold: bringing the Intelligence and Security Committee into 
parliament’, Intelligence and National Security 34: 1, 2019, pp. 22–37.
70 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: 2001–2010, p. 1.
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Denial and the future-prooing of British torture
The prevention of unfettered access to the documentary evidence relating to 
Britain’s collusion in torture has enabled the broader narrative of denial to be 
sustained. In maintaining this position in the face of the ISC’s indings of system-
atic collusion, ministers have placed emphasis on what they have termed the ‘new 
and challenging operating environment for which, in some cases, they were not 
prepared’, in which the intelligence agencies took ‘too long to recognise that 
guidance and training for staf was inadequate, and too long to understand fully 
and take appropriate action on the risks arising from our engagement with inter-
national partners on detainee issues’.71 In other words, any errors of judgement in 
the early years of the ‘war on terror’ are attributable to a lack of guidance, and a 
lack of understanding of the practices of other states (especially the US). In turn, 
ministers are now clear that these (limited) lessons ‘have been learned from these 
challenging events’, and that ‘the position now is very diferent from the one 
confronting UK personnel in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001’.72 
Accordingly, current guidance ‘provides clear direction for UK personnel and 
governs their interaction with detainees held by others and the handling of any 
intelligence received from them’, and is ‘coupled with world-leading independent 
oversight’.73 We need ‘to look forward as well as backwards’, and in this light ‘the 
statutory and administrative basis on which our afairs are now organised give us 
much greater assurance in the House that decisions are made appropriately and 
that our agencies adhere to the highest possible standards of conduct’.74 We are 
not convinced.
From July 2010, British intelligence personnel have had to operate within the 
constraints laid out by the Consolidated guidance to intelligence oicers and service personnel 
on the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas, and on the passing and receipt of intel-
ligence relating to detainees (hereafter Consolidated guidance).75 The approach outlined 
in the guidance was not new, the government argued, and was ‘consistent with 
the internal guidelines under which the security and intelligence services and 
our armed forces currently operate’. Nonetheless, it was ‘putting into the public 
domain for the irst time the policy framework within which we operate’, thereby 
making an ‘unprecedented’ move to increase transparency in this area.76
Following the publication of the ISC reports in 2018, the UK government 
instructed the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPCO) to review the Consoli-
dated guidance. This review included a public consultation, with a closed round table 
71 HM Government, Government response, p. 9; Hansard (Commons), 28 June 2018, col. 41WS.
72 Hansard (Commons), 18 July 2019, col. 974.
73 Hansard (Commons), 2 July 2018, col. 25, 10 May 2018, col. 927. 
74 Hansard (Commons), 15 July 2019, col. 591–6.
75 HM Government, Consolidated guidance to intelligence oicers and service personnel on the detention and interviewing 
of detainees overseas, and on the passing and receipt of intelligence relating to detainees (London: Cabinet Oice, 2010), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ile/62632/
Consolidated_Guidance_November_2011.pdf.
76 HM Government, Note of additional information from the secretary of state for foreign and Commonwealth afairs, the 
home secretary, and defence secretary (London, July 2010), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ile/62633/additional-information-fcohods_0.pdf.
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for interested civil society parties in December 2018.77 IPCO’s review resulted in 
a series of recommendations for improving the Consolidated guidance, all of which 
were accepted by the government (although many of our recommendations, and 
those from other civil society organizations, were not taken on board by IPCO). 
The government subsequently published an updated framework to come into 
force in January 2020 under a new (but equally contorted) title: The principles 
relating to the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas and the passing and receipt of 
intelligence relating to detainees (hereafter Principles).78 Most changes introduced in the 
Principles are relatively minor. Nevertheless, many commentators have welcome 
the inclusion of rendition as a form of torture and CIDT, along with the increase 
in the number of UK organizations who are bound by the Principles, so that it 
now covers, among others, SO15 (the Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism 
Command), and joint units comprising overseas personnel but acting under UK 
direction. 
Although both the Consolidated guidance and the Principles have been championed 
as providing a robust and principled framework, in reality they are constructed 
in such a way as to allow British intelligence and ministers signiicant opera-
tional leeway, speciically to enable continued collusion in torture and CIDT. At 
the heart of the Principles (as of the Consolidated guidance) is the requirement for 
personnel to make a judgement on the risk that participation by the UK in the 
location, capture, detention or interrogation of prisoners held by partner agencies 
would lead to unlawful killing, torture, CIDT, rendition or other ‘unaccept-
able standards of arrest and detention’.79 Where intelligence personnel ‘know or 
believe’ that such participation (including through intelligence-sharing) would 
lead to unlawful killing, torture or extraordinary rendition (deined as rendition 
where there is a real risk of torture or CIDT), such action is expressly prohib-
ited. However, and crucially, similar action which is judged as leading to a ‘real 
risk’ of such consequences is not so prohibited.80 Instead, personnel need either to 
introduce mechanisms to ‘efectively mitigate the risk to below the threshold of 
real risk through reliable caveats or assurances’ or else to consult with ministers.81 
Much has been written on the problems with assurances, often in the context of 
the UK’s legal commitments when considering the extradition or deportation of 
individuals.82 Courts in the UK, as well as the European Court of Human Rights, 
have spent much time considering the issue, and have required that such assurances 
77 Ruth Blakeley and Sam Raphael, Recommendations for reform of the Consolidated guidance: submission to the 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner consultation (Sheield and London: University of Sheield and University of 
Westminster, 25 Oct. 2018), https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/RDI/181025-TRP-Consol-
idated-Guidance-Recommendations.pdf. 
78 HM Government, The principles relating to the detention and interviewing of detainees overseas and the passing and 
receipt of intelligence to detainees (London, 18 July 2019), https://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/
RDI/190718-HMG-Principles.pdf.
79 Principles, pp. 4–5.
80 In the Consolidated guidance the operative phrase was ‘serious risk’, which was found by the High Court to be 
a substantively equivalent term: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2011/2401.html, para. 61.
81 Principles, p. 6.
82 See e.g. Andrew Jillions, ‘When a gamekeeper turns poacher: torture, diplomatic assurances and the politics 
of trust’, International Afairs 91: 3, 2015, pp. 489–504.
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be buttressed with post-transfer monitoring and high-level political commitments 
from both sides. Although such ‘diplomatic assurances’ remain deeply problematic, 
the assurances mandated in the Principles appear to be notably weak in comparison 
with these stipulations. It is unclear what guidance intelligence personnel have to 
equip them to judge the level of risk, and therefore the potential need for assur-
ances. Full details of the external oversight of the assurances process are not made 
public, although a summary recently published by IPCO makes clear that the 
agencies do not have a ‘thorough and consistent approach to record keeping’, and 
do not record full details of the underlying basis for the safeguards relied upon.83 
Worryingly, the Principles continue to allow for ‘reliable caveats or assurances’ 
to be agreed with partner agencies verbally rather than in writing.84 In practice, 
almost all assurances are verbal, with few written records of individual assurances 
or even the total number sought by the agencies.85 Instead, as the director-general 
of MI5 made clear to the ISC, a wholly unaccountable ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ 
sits at the heart of the current framework:
There is a sort of supericial attractiveness about wanting MOUs ...  In practice of course 
...  it is not a practical thing to pursue in many instances because it is not achievable. But 
the same efect is achievable by ...  agreement, explanation, negotiation and a clear eye-to-
eye understanding with the liaison in question ...86
More worryingly still, in cases where even verbal assurances cannot be obtained 
from the liaison service—in other words, where that service refuses even to agree 
verbally to treat the prisoner in accordance with its duties under international 
law—or where such assurances are assessed to be unreliable, consultation with 
ministers may still lead to the action being authorized.87 Ministers, in other words, 
may authorize participation in activities where there is a real risk of torture, even 
where partner agencies with past records of the systematic use of torture are 
unwilling or unable to persuade UK personnel that they will treat the suspect in 
accordance with international law. 
Such authorization is clearly on the cards: when giving evidence to the ISC, 
senior ministers including Theresa May, Amber Rudd, Boris Johnson and Philip 
Hammond all made references to ‘ticking bomb’ scenarios as potentially justi-
fying operations where torture might occur.88 As May (then home secretary) 
made clear: ‘What I am saying is that you’re always balancing risks and that’s 
why the circumstances in which something occurs in that sense is—it’s a di -
cult judgement. It’s a di cult balance.’ Hammond (then foreign secretary) was 
equally open to the possibility of authorizing torture: ‘I’d have to make a judge-
ment about whether the protection of [a terrorist’s] human rights outweighed 
the human rights of the possibly thousands of people that would be killed or 
83 IPCO, Annual report 2017 (London: HMSO, Dec. 2018), https://www.ipco.org.uk/docs/IPCO%20Annual%20
Report%202017%20Web%20Accessible%20Version%2020190131.pdf, p. 82.
84 Principles, p. 7
85 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: current issues, p. 59.
86 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: current issues, p. 60.
87 Principles, p. 6.
88 ISC, ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: current issues, pp. 74–7. 
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 h
ttp
s
://a
c
a
d
e
m
ic
.o
u
p
.c
o
m
/ia
/a
d
v
a
n
c
e
-a
rtic
le
-a
b
s
tra
c
t/d
o
i/1
0
.1
0
9
3
/ia
/iia
a
0
1
7
/5
8
1
3
5
3
2
 b
y
 g
u
e
s
t o
n
 0
3
 A
p
ril 2
0
2
0
Accountability, denial and the future-proofing of British torture
17
International Afairs 00: 0, 2020
injured as a consequence of [the act of terrorism].’ This ‘weighing of the beneits 
and risks’ opens the doors to continued complicity, based on the assessment of 
operational necessity. 
This concern is more than hypothetical. As Hammond further testiied, he 
had dealt with cases where there was a ‘serious risk’ of CIDT but where ‘the 
beneit of the operation is such that it outweighs the risk ...  This is a judgement. 
Clearly one has to make a judgement about the importance of the operation.’89 
Indeed, it is now clear that the recourse to torture continues to be hardwired into 
the contemporary practice of British intelligence. Hitherto secret MoD policy 
guidance, designed to operationalize the Consolidated guidance, was discovered by 
the authors and released in May 2019.90 This guidance states clearly that ministers 
can authorize intelligence-sharing in cases where the risk of torture is ‘serious’, as 
long as they ‘agree that the potential beneits justify accepting the risk and the legal 
consequences that may follow’. Indeed, such operations can be ‘preapproved’ by 
ministers in exceptional cases, ensuring that—in efect—individuals can be placed 
on a list to enable intelligence to be shared regardless of there being a serious risk 
of their torture.91 Although the MoD has since refused to release igures relating 
to the number of times ministers have authorized such action (a decision which is 
currently under challenge), and although the ISC report redacted all such igures 
from its report on request from the intelligence agencies,92 past indings by the 
authors demonstrate that in one year alone (2014) ministers approved all 28 ‘serious 
risk’ cases brought before them.93
That these practices are considered by oicials to open themselves, in theory if 
not in practice, to legal action in UK courts is conirmed by the fact that, when 
referring Consolidated guidance cases to ministers, intelligence oicials routinely seek 
parallel authorization under section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994. This 
legislation provides for a minister to authorize action undertaken overseas by the 
intelligence services which would otherwise be unlawful under UK law. As SIS 
conirmed: ‘We are ...  always going to go for a section 7 authorisation. Because, 
you know, why should my oicers carry the risks on behalf of the government 
personally?’94
Conclusion
The UK’s obligations in relation to torture are clear. Joint Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the UK Human Rights Act prohibits torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment. Under the Human Rights Act, the state 
89 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: current issues, pp. 75–6.
90 Lucy Fisher, ‘Torture: Britain breaks law in Ministry of Defence secret policy’, The Times, 20 May 2019, 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/edition/news/torture-britain-breaks-law-in-ministry-of-defence-secret-pol-
icy-2rl5dn2kd.
91 MoD, MoD policy on the passing or receipt of intelligence relating to detained or captured persons (London: Nov. 2018), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6015916-MOD-Torture-Policy-Nov-2018.html.
92 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: current issues, pp. 17–18.
93 MoD, Freedom of Information decision notice FOI2014/05808, 8 Dec. 2014.
94 ISC, Detainee mistreatment and rendition: current issues, p. 72. 
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has obligations to intervene to stop torture and cruel treatment where it knows 
such treatment is occurring. The United Nations Convention Against Torture, to 
which the UK is a signatory, prohibits the invocation of any exceptional circum-
stances—whether a state of war or threat of war, internal political stability or any 
other political emergency—as a justiication for torture. Importantly, under the 
doctrine of command responsibility, leaders—military or civilian—can be held 
criminally responsible if they knew or should have known of human rights viola-
tions and did nothing to prevent them.95
Alongside these longstanding legal obligations, the British government’s 
response to torturous practices in Northern Ireland, at least on the face of it, 
seemed to suggest that lessons on the ineicacy and counterproductivity of 
torture from Britain’s post-colonial period had been learned. However, both the 
extent of UK collusion in torture in the ‘war on terror’ and systematic attempts 
to deny accountability leave us questioning how deeply this learning has gone. 
There is little evidence of cultural transformation: mistaken beliefs about torture’s 
supposed eicacy stubbornly persist within the intelligence services and, as state-
ments from several government ministers show, among political leaders as well. 
This failure to learn also helps explain the self-contradictory, competing narratives 
constructed by Britain’s leaders to explain away their involvement in torture. One 
version of Britain’s intelligence agencies portrays them as supremely competent, 
with the capacity to develop and follow robust guidance and exercise practised 
judgement, in line with strict legal and ethical rules. The other version presents 
a lawed bureaucracy, unaware until too late of the harsh realities of the ‘war 
on terror’. To us, this latter portrayal begins to look like a deliberate diversion 
strategy, enabling minimal continued oversight of contemporary practice in the 
ield of intelligence-sharing and alleging that unintended collusion in torture is 
the result of lawed processes rather than any speciic policy. 
We have attempted to show in this article that the machinery of denial is 
designed in part to leave open the option of colluding in torture again. We have 
argued that the past and the present are entwined. It is only through a refusal to 
acknowledge the full extent of torture in the ‘war on terror’ that current forms 
of complicity can continue to sit at the heart of British intelligence and security 
practices, and that the two contradictory images of the UK’s intelligence services 
can sit side by side. The framing of current guidance as substantively more robust 
functions to further delay a reckoning with the past. This insistence can be seen 
in stark terms in the recent refusal of the government, in July 2019, to authorize 
a full judge-led inquiry, given
the extensive work already undertaken to improve policies and practices in this area ... 
Parliament and the public can have conidence in the efectiveness of measures taken 
since 2010 and the new principles announced by the Government today to strengthen the 
accountability and oversight by Ministers, Parliament and the independent commissioners 
of the vital work of our security and intelligence agencies.96
95 Geofrey Robertson, Crimes against humanity: the struggle for global justice (London: Penguin, 1999), pp. 206–207.
96 Hansard (Commons), 18 July 2019, col. 974–5.
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Impunity is baked in at every level. The logical conclusion we must draw is that 
the UK government is unprepared to rule out the torture option. Thanks to legal 
action against the government by two MPs and the charity Reprieve, at the time 
of writing we await the outcome of a judicial review of that refusal by Theresa 
May’s government in July 2019. Should this action prove successful, there may yet 
be a fuller reckoning with Britain’s torturous past. But even if a judge-led inquiry 
ensues, successive governments’ highly efective eforts to evade accountability 
have already limited its scope, including the potential for prosecution. Owing to 
repeated delay and diversion over many years, evidence will have been lost, inding 
agents who were there at the time of the abuse of prisoners after so long will 
not be straightforward, and memories of who said and did what will have long 
faded. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that orders were given in explicit terms 
that would necessarily provide compelling evidence for prosecutions of speciic 
individuals. So, while there are important legal precedents for holding responsible 
those in leadership positions who knew or should have known what was going on, 
this does not make identifying those leaders a straightforward matter.
Conventional wisdom assumes that the presence of mechanisms for account-
ability helps to prevent states from committing human rights violations. But leaders 
in democracies have found many ways to circumvent those mechanisms extremely 
efectively, historically and more recently. Mitchell’s conclusions continue to 
hold—leaders in democracies do not take responsibility for human rights viola-
tions, nor are they held responsible for them. His and our indings show that there 
has been a collective failure in policy circles as well as in the scholarly community 
to recognize how fragile those mechanisms really are in the face of ‘opportun-
ism’s pull’. 97 But the analysis presented here also raises the question of whether 
we can be at all conident that the presence of such mechanisms is really a strong 
predictor of compliance with human rights obligations. The analysis suggests 
that those mechanisms have been deliberately subsumed within the machinery of 
denial, rendering them not only inefective but also potentially dangerous tools 
in facilitating democratic states’ non-compliance with human rights obligations. 
Valuable scholarly endeavour might explore what it would take to establish more 
robust mechanisms for accountability, and greater public scrutiny of the things 
that governments do in our names.
97 Mitchell, Democracy’s blameless leaders, p. 189.
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